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1. Basic proposal: 
 
 
Long-term incentives to be delivered in the form of “Career Shares” which would be 
granted on an annual basis and vest after, say, three years with the quantum vesting 
possibly being dependent on performance over that period.  The major differentiating 
feature between Career Shares and Performance Shares is that, on vesting, the former 
would prohibit the director from cashing in (transferring ownership) the vested shares 
until retirement or exit from the company, with the possibility that this restriction 
would extend until two or more years after exit. 
 
The following diagrams present an illustration of the difference between the two 
approaches of Performance Shares versus Career Shares: 
 
                                                 
1 For a fuller discussion of this proposal see Brian G M Main, “Executive Pay – a career perspective”, 
Hume Occasional Paper, No. 89, June 2011.  The author is grateful to all those who attended his David 
Hume Institute seminar on 1 June 2010, and for all of the through provoking comments received. 
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Figure 1 
Conventional vesting pattern (e.g., Performance Shares) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Career Shares Vesting and cashing-in pattern 
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2. Key features: 
 
• The Career Shares form of long-term incentive arrangement would, upon 
vesting prohibit any cashing-in or divesting or hedging until a given number of 
years after the individual has left the company (whether through retirement or 
for other reasons). 
 
• The post-exit holding period could range from one year all the way up to four 
years.  Normally it would be expected to be set at 2-years.  This delay in 
cashing-in is the essential novelty of the Careers Shares approach, namely 
separating vesting and transferability, to provide a truly long term incentive. 
 
• At all times, from the granting of the incentive award, through the vesting 
event, and until the end of the restriction period, the quantum of shares under 
award would be increased in direct proportion to the dividend yield enjoyed by 
shareholders, with effect at each ex-dividend date. 
 
• To meet any tax liability upon the executive resulting from a successful 
vesting event, a proportion of the realised reward would, exceptionally, be 
allowed to be cashed in for this purpose. 
 
• In order to appraise shareholders of the cumulative effect of this arrangement, 
the Directors Remuneration Report should contain a cumulative valuation of  
those shares whose transferability continues to the restricted under the Career 
Shares arrangement.  This would be separated from information regarding any 
other beneficial holding of shares by that executive. 
 
• In addition to the holding of Career Shares, the cumulative total remuneration 
realised by the executive throughout the time in post (as a boardroom director) 
would also be reported.  This would include salary, cash bonuses received, the 
cash value of pension contributions made by the company, the cash equivalent 
of other payments received, and the cash value realized on the sale of any 
performance shares or share options that had been cashed in (including for 
reasons of meeting tax liabilities, as mentioned above). 
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3. Discussion of technical issues: 
 
3.1 Restriction on transferability - during the period of employment 
 
During the period of employment, qualitatively this would be similar to restrictions 
that currently apply in many board-room incentive schemes such as mandatory 
deferral of bonus, and an early form of this arrangement can be found in the recent 
HSBC proposed Group Performance Share Plan 
 
Directors are usually prohibited2 from making any investments that would offset or 
hedge the effect of the Career Shares type of incentive.  For example, for companies 
whose shares trade on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, the legal 
situation is governed by Listing Rule 9.2.8 of the FSA Handbook3 and the Model 
Code4 in Listing Rule 9, Annex 1. This places significant restrictions on the ability of 
directors to deal in shares or other securities (including financial derivatives5) of their 
own company. Prior clearance must first be obtained from the Chairman of the 
company and approval must be refused in certain circumstances. 
 
“A director (other than the chairman or chief executive) or 
company secretary must not deal in any securities of the 
company without first notifying the chairman (or a director 
designated by the board for this purpose) and receiving clearance 
to deal from him.” 
 
 
 
3.2 Restriction on transferability – subsequent to the period of employment 
 
Once the contract of employment has terminated, further restriction on transferability 
of vested shares becomes subject to the common law public policy doctrine6.  The 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to Professor Hector MacQueen and David Cabrelli of the Edinburgh University School 
of Law for guidance in these matters. 
3 http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR/9/2 
4 http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR/9/Annex1 
5 Including “entering into a contract (including a contract for difference) the purpose of which is to 
secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in the price of any of the securities of the 
company;” and “the grant, acceptance, acquisition, disposal, exercise or discharge of any option 
(whether for the call, or put or both) to acquire or dispose of any of the securities of the company”.  
6 See “A Law and Economics look at Contracts against Public Policy”,  Harvard Law Review, March 
2006, Vol. 119 Issue 5, p1445-1466, 22p. 
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benefit to the company brought about by the restriction is required to be weighed 
against the negative impact on the owner of the shares on which the restriction bears.  
As in areas of employment law pertaining to the length of gardening leave or the 
length and scope of non-compete clauses, the courts are likely to take an unfavourable 
view of anything that smacks of an overt restraint of trade.  As such, any attempted 
extension of the restriction period to as long as two years following the termination of 
employment may be challenged in court.   
 
The issue may be worth testing however, as the voiding of post termination restrictive 
covenants (those restrictions on an employees actions that are intended to bind after 
employment has ceased) is based on the view that they are anti-competitive and in 
restraint of trade.  The locking up of a director’s capital does not fall so clearly under 
this heading as might, say, a restriction on choice of employer (in a non-compete 
clause).  This is particularly true in the sense that the very accumulation of the capital 
would not have been possible (or so readily made available) had it not been possible 
to design the contract in this very manner (as in Career Shares).  As such, it may well 
be possible to justify the “reasonableness” of the arrangement.  There would remain 
the right to property protocol in the European Convention of Human Rights7: 
 
“No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 
Once again, however, it may well be possible to satisfy the implied restrictions of 
Career Shares on the grounds of general interest and proportionality. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Aida Grgić, Zvonimir Mataga, Matija Longar and Ana Vilfan (2007) “The right to property 
under the European Convention on Human Rights. A guide to the implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, Human Rights Handbook No. 10, European Council. 
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3.3 Dividend payments 
 
After the initial post-Greenbury8 flurry if adoption of Performance Share plans, 
remuneration committees became aware of the bias such arrangements would have on 
decisions relating to dividends (owing to directors having claim to the delivery of 
company shares at the end of a three-year period).  The share price is, obviously,  
likely to grow more if the maximum possible earnings are retained within the 
company rather than disbursed through dividend payment.  Performance metrics such 
as total shareholder return are generally neutral to whether shareholders enjoy capital 
gains in the share price or enhanced dividend yields.  Those dependent on healthy 
dividend yields (pension funds and others) were therefore alarmed at the perverse 
incentive that Performance Shares might create to restrain or even diminish dividends 
payment. 
 
To remedy the situation, it soon became standard practice to augment the quantum of 
target shares available to the director so as to exactly reflect the dividend yield 
awarded in the relevant years.  This essentially made the director the recipient of 
dividends during the unvested period of the award.  As an example, the following 
extract is taken from the details of Kingfisher’s Performance Share Plan: 
 
“Holders of awards of forfeitable shares will have certain 
shareholder rights, except that they will be required to waive their 
right to receive dividends. 
 
Participants will receive a payment (in shares), on or shortly 
following the vesting of their awards, of an amount equivalent to 
the dividends that would have been paid on the shares (assuming 
reinvestment in shares on the relevant ex-dividend dates) that vest 
between the granting of the awards and their vesting.” 
 
 
It is proposed here that under the Career Shares arrangements a similar approach is 
adopted.  Once Career Shares have vested then dividends would be paid to the 
director in shares, and prior to vesting the quantum of the award would be adjusted 
pro-rata with the achieved dividend yield. 
                                                 
8 Greenbury, Sir Richard (1995). “Directors’ Remuneration.  Report of a study group chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury”.  London:  Gee Publishing Ltd (July). A report which did much to move directors 
remuneration arrangements away from a reliance on share option plans and towards the use of 
Performance Share Plans. 
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3.4 Tax liabilities 
 
With unapproved schemes (the type in use for boardroom directors), the employee is 
liable for income tax and employee national insurance contributions on the gains 
realised at the point when the options are exercised or when conditional shares vest. 
Employer national insurance contributions are also due (and by prior agreement may 
also be the responsibility of the employee). 
 
Because with conventional conditional share awards (such as Performance Shares), it 
is the vesting or transfer of ownership of shares to the director gives rise to a tax 
charge on the value of the shares at that point, this tax charge can be deferred by 
vesting nil-price options at that stage.  The life of the option (usually a further seven 
years) then allows the director to delay the tax charge. 
 
The two arrangements (share awards versus nil-price options) are not exactly 
equivalent, of course.  The eventual tax charge (and the company’s national insurance 
tax liability) will depend on the final value realised when the nil-price options are 
exercised.  For the company, this potential national insurance tax liability is partly 
off-set by corporation tax relief9. 
 
The accumulation of substantial amounts of claims to shares under such an 
arrangement would require the company to manage the accounting of such an 
overhang with care –to avoid infringing the dilution limits in force. An alternative is 
to budget for the liability through use of open market purchases of shares by making 
use of market-purchased shares held by an employee benefit trust . 
 
By using longer life nil-price options (or executive share options) it would be possible 
to further delay the tax event.  But 10 years is the usual maximum in such 
arrangements.  Indeed, IVIS Guidelines(2009) declare: 
 
“7.2 Shares and options should not vest or be exercisable within 
three years from the date of grant. In addition, options should not be 
exercisable more than 10 years from the date of grant.” 
                                                 
9 Indeed, the employer national insurance contributions due my be recovered from the employee if the 
transfer of shares in involved. 
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So, with directors enjoying long boardroom careers (and, recall, that the typical CEO 
is in post for only 4.5 years) there will be a need for a tax recognition of any 
accumulated gains and, in this case, a partial release of funds sufficient to meet the 
resulting tax expense (currently 50% income tax, 2% employee Nics, and 13.8% 
employer Nics). 
 
 
3.5 Cumulative reporting 
 
Both in terms of providing key information to the shareholders or other stakeholders 
and as a reminder to the directors themselves, it is proposed that the Directors 
Remuneration Report provide a cumulative record of the income received by each 
director over the period to date that they have spent in post10.  This could follow 
current reporting practice but with the addition of an extra line providing the 
cumulative outcome.  It would be necessary to value the current holding of vested and 
unvested shares in the company. 
 
Set against the cumulative company performance over the same period, this would 
provide a much closer reflection of the link between pay and performance than is 
currently available when annual company results are offered along side what is a 
snapshot of a single year’s remuneration.  The DDR currently does a poor job at 
providing a single figure to capture the reward of any particular director.  Under 
current practice, a list of pay components is provided, not all of which are capable of 
being readily summed together (e.g., salary reported in £ but the award of 
performance shares in the form of units of shares). Equally there is a blurring of pay 
awarded (as in the previous example) versus pay realised (where the focus would be 
on the value of performance shares vesting rather than the number of performance 
shares awarded). 
 
 
                                                 
10 There is scope for debate over what best constitutes the definition of a post in this context.  One view 
would hold that all time as a director should be continuously viewed as a ‘post’ (in the legal sense that 
a director is a director is a director).  Alternatively moves between Finance Director and CEO might 
constitute distinct ‘posts’. 
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4. Conclusion: 
 
 
A Career Shares approach to long term incentives offers considerable advantage over 
the current practice of annual awards of three-year incentives that are free to be 
cashed in as soon as they vest.  The advantage of Career Shares would be that they 
both encourage and allow the director to take a longer term perspective in the delivery 
of strategy.  Early promise that is not sustained is no longer rewarded, as Career 
Shares bring with them an automatic claw-back facility.  Equally, if the restriction on 
cashing in can be maintained for a year or two after exit from the board, each director 
is given a clear interest to ensure that the succession process delivers sustained good 
company performance. 
 
There are, of course, some practical considerations that need to be confronted before a 
Career Shares approach can be implemented.  These include:  
 
• Enforcing the prohibition against any cashing-in, or 
divesting, or hedging of Career Shares until a given 
length of time after the individual has left the company 
(whether through retirement or for other reasons). 
 
• The adjustment of the quantum of Career Shares in direct 
proportion to the dividend yield enjoyed by shareholders, 
with effect at each ex-dividend date. 
 
• Cashing in of a proportion of vested shares to meet tax 
liabilities would be necessary, although share plan design 
could reduce the empirical impact of this effect. 
 
• Reporting in the Directors Remuneration Report should 
be improved to provide the cumulative value of Career 
Shares held by each director (both vested and unvested). 
In addition, these holdings should be placed in 
perspective by similarly reporting the cumulative reward 
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enjoyed by the director from all other sources of company 
remuneration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
